Abstract: The literature on mathematics suggests that intuition plays a role in it as a ground of belief. This article explores the nature of intuition as it occurs in mathematical thinking. Section 1 suggests that intuitions should be understood by analogy with perceptions. Section 2 explains what fleshing out such an analogy requires. Section 3 discusses Kantian ways of fleshing it out. Section 4 discusses Platonist ways of fleshing it out. Section 5 sketches a proposal for resolving the main problem facing Platonists-the problem of explaining how our experiences make contact with mathematical reality.
visual imagination as a means to gaining intuitive awareness of abstract objects. This is related to Kant's view of mathematical intuition, which I discuss below.
Finally, according to Stanislas Dehaene in passage [c] when you intuit that p
what happens is that you have the spontaneous impression that p-an impression that is fast, automatic, and introspectively opaque. Let's call this the view of intuition as spontaneous impression. This view of intuition-as it occurs both inside and outside of mathematical contexts-is common among cognitive psychologists; for a helpful overview see Daniel Kahneman's Nobel Prize speech (Kahneman 2002) from which I have borrowed the term "impression." However, even if some of the experiences we rely on in forming mathematical beliefs come to us as spontaneous impressions, most do not. Consider, for example, the proposition that between any circle and any point outside of it there are exactly two tangents. Brief reflection should make this obvious-but note that it likely does take some reflection, unless, say, you are recalling it from memory.
The balance of this chapter focuses on mathematical intuitions conceived of as the perceptualist view suggests. The view of intuition as concrete illustration and the view of intuition as spontaneous impression both pick out real phenomena worth exploring. But here is a working hypothesis that seems plausible to me: the phenomena they pick out answer to partial rather than complete conceptions of mathematical intuition. The view of intuition as concrete illustration focuses on a partial aspect of some mathematical intuitions, namely the use of visual imagination as a means to awareness of the abstract subject matter of mathematical propositions. If we focused on this, we would be focusing on the means not the end, namely an intuition that involves awareness of mathematical subject matter. The view of intuition as spontaneous impression focuses on a special subclass of mathematical intuitions, namely mathematical intuitions that do not depend on those general purpose cognitive abilities we exercise in reflection, and so that are more amenable to the sort of investigation that has proved most fruitful in cognitive psychology. If we focused on this, we would be focusing on a special sort of mathematical intuition, not mathematical intuition in general.
Perception and Intuition
According to the perceptualist view of intuition, mathematical intuitions are similar to sensory perceptions in some respects, and different in other respects. The quote from Gödel gives some indications about these points of similarity and difference. The aim of this section is to bring them into better focus, and the natural place to start is with some observations about sensory perception.
Sensory perception is a way of gaining information about your immediate environment. For example, you might see that there is mail in your mailbox.
Consider this perception. There are two features of it that I want to highlight. It is worth emphasizing that this is only part of the answer. While the causal condition might be necessary for perception, it is not sufficient. For any given perceptual experience of yours is caused by events in your brain, but most of your perceptual experiences are not perceptions of events in your brain. We will not try to specify sufficient conditions for perception here. In general, then, a perceptual experience is a genuine perception rather than a mere hallucination only if it meets a causal condition:
If your perceptual experience representing that p is a genuine perception that p, then it is partly because the items in your environment in virtue of which p is true cause your perceptual experience.
The first feature of perception characterizes its phenomenology. This second feature of perception characterizes its metaphysical structure, specifically how it is hooked up to its subject matter.
Proponents of perceptualist views of intuition can appeal to these two features in specifying more exactly the similarities and differences between mathematical intuition and perception. The idea is that mathematical intuitions are phenomenologically like perceptions in possessing presentational phenomenology, but metaphysically different from perceptions in not hooking up to their subject matter causally. Anyone who wants to defend such a view must explain two things.
The first is how your mathematical intuitions make their subject matter seem present to you given that it is not by representing it as standing before you in your immediate environment-e.g. as mail is represented, when it appears sitting there in your mailbox. The second is how your mathematical intuitions hook up to their subject matter given that their subject matter-e.g. circularity-is abstract and so causally inert.
3. Kantian Views In broad outline, Kant's view of mathematical intuition has been more influential on both the philosophical and the mathematical tradition than that of any other writer. The aim of this section is to sketch his view, relate it to the perceptualist way of thinking about intuition, and briefly discuss its influence on early twentieth century developments in the foundations of mathematics. The first order of business will be to calibrate some terminology.
Suppose you come to know by intuition that circles are symmetrical about their diameters. In this case, the perceptualist would say:
--You have an intuition.
--It makes it seem to you that circles are symmetrical about their diameters.
--And in it you are aware of the items in virtue of which it is true that circles are symmetrical about their diameters.
Kant also makes a threefold distinction corresponding to the seeming, the awareness, and the whole experience that combines them, but he uses different terminology. He writes:
Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of which is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty for cognizing an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of concepts); through the former an object is given to us, through the latter it is thought in relation to that representation…Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to (2) Our capacity for sensation imposes forms on the objects of our intuitive awareness; space is the form of intuitable objects outside of us; time is the form of all intuitable objects.
This claim draws together a number of points developed in the Transcendental Aesthetic section of the Critique; (Kant 199 pgs 155 --192; A20 -A49/B34 -B73).
(3 Mathematical subject matter-space and time themselves-must conform to the forms that our capacity for sensation imposes on the objects of our intuitive awareness.
This claim is associated with Kant's "Copernican Revolution." Here is a quote from the introduction where he sketches the main idea: "If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object…conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself. (Kant 1999 pg. 110; Bxvi -Bxvii); see also (Kant 1999 pg 176; B41). Note that an object's conforming to the forms imposed on objects of our intuitive awareness is a different relation between it and intuitive awareness than either creation or affection. In creation the object causally depends on the mind; in affection the mind causally depends on the object. In the conforming relation Kant invokes the object non--causally depends on the mind. So
Kant recognized a third possibility. In the next section we will consider a fourth. Intuitionists tended to reject the parts of standard mathematics-e.g. standard real
analysis-that seemed to raise problems for mathematical intuition. Formalists tended to divide mathematics into a "real" part to which mathematical intuition has access and about which it is reliable, and an "unreal" part that must be developed in So if we are intuitively aware of triangularity it is not because it affects us, we create it, or it must conform to forms determined by our capacity for sensation. There must be some fourth relation. Second, in contrast to Kant, Descartes argues that intuitive awareness is independent of our capacity for sensation-even if it sometimes involves sensory experiences.
[a] But if I want to think of a chiliagon, although I understand that it is a figure consisting of a thousand sides just as well as I understand the triangle to be a three--sided figure, I do not in the same way imagine the thousand sides or see them as if they were present before me. Descartes notes that our thought might be associated with imagery. And in [c] Descartes emphasizes-in reply to Gassendi-that there is more than just imagery;
there is an awareness of the chiliagon based on thought and independent of imagery. What all this shows is that the Platonist must offer non--Kantian explanations of how mathematical intuitions make their subject matter seem present, and in good cases succeed in hooking up to it. One difficulty is that the concept of awareness based on thought can seem confused. There is a difference between thinking about something and being aware of it. You can think about all sorts of things that you are not aware of-e.g. the center of the sun. When we have in mind sensory awareness, this contrast is
obvious. But what does the contrast consist in when we have in mind awareness based on thought? What could being aware of an object by thinking about it be other than just thinking about it? To get a handle on this issue, we must distinguish between two kinds of thought. Suppose you are alone in your hotel room in France and you think:
(1) The tallest man in France is over 6ft tall.
Then you step outside and see a man who happens to be-though of course you do not know this-the tallest man in France, and you think:
(2) That man is over 6ft tall.
Even though (1) and (2) attribute the same property to the same guy, call him Jacques, they are quite different in nature.
(1) attributes a property to Jacques because it attributes a property to whoever is the tallest man in France and Jacques is the tallest man in France. It picks Jacques out by description and is a descriptive thought. (2) attributes a property to Jacques because it is a thought you have that is grounded in the presence of Jacques himself. It picks Jacques out by demonstration and is a demonstrative thought. Notice that you couldn't have entertained (2) But we still have to say something about its phenomenology and how it hooks you up to the object of awareness. About the first issue, let us note that there is such a thing as seeming to be in a state that enables demonstrative thought. Suppose when you step out of your room you do not really see Jacques but only hallucinate a very tall man. Your experience makes it seem to you as if you can pick someone out bydemonstration, but really you cannot. A similar thing can happen with thought. So if we want to say what it feels like from the inside to seem to be aware of the subject matter of a mathematical intuition, we should say that it feels like being in a state that enables demonstrative thoughts about that object:
Whenever you have a mathematical intuition representing that p your mathematical intuition also makes it seem to you as if you are intuitively aware of the items in virtue of which p is true, and it does so in virtue of making it seem to you as if you are in a state that enables demonstrative thoughts about those items.
Notice that this characterization of the presentational phenomenology found in mathematical intuition leaves open the possibility that sometimes it substantively relies on imagery, sometimes it is merely accompanied by imagery, and sometimes it occurs without imagery at all and is a matter of pure thinking. This is just as the Platonist should expect. Descartes does not discuss how intuitive awareness relates to its objects in detail, and what he says is misleading. When he discusses the "eternal truths" in his
Principles of Philosophy, for example, he describes them as having "no existence outside our thought" and says of an example-that nothing comes from nothingthat it "resides within our mind." (Descartes 1985a pg 208 -209; AT 23 -24) . This makes it seem as if intuitive awareness should be assimilated to introspective awareness! Aside from its prima facie implausibility, it is in tension with the claim that mathematical objects are mind--independent with which we began this section.
There is, however, another way to interpret the idea. Plotinus, for example, calls (a part of) abstract reality Intellect and his view of what it is for us finite creatures to exercise our intellectual capacities is for us to be in accord with
Intellect:
The activities of Intellect are from above just as the activities arising from sense--perception are from below. We are this-the principal part of the soul, in the middle between two powers…Intellect is disputed, because we do not always use it, and because it is separate. And it is separate owing to its not inclining toward us, whereas we rather are looking upward to it. Sense--perception is our messenger, but Intellect "is our king."
But we are kings, too, whenever we are in accord with Intellect. We can be in accord with it in two ways: either by having, in a way, its writings written in us like laws or by being, in a way, filled up with it and then being able to see it or perceive it as being present. (From the Enneads excerpted in
Dillon and Gerson 2004 pgs 89 -90).
Intellect is not something that we create, nor something that affects us, nor something that must conform to forms determined by us. Rather Intellect is something that we conform to insofar as we succeed in exercising our intellectual capacities, such as the capacity for intuitive awareness of mathematical objects. So (2) My car is parked illegally because it is parked next to a fire hydrant. intuitive awareness must be a non--basic experience that is constituted out of other experiences, such as thoughts and imaginings. Seeing a hula--hoop, for example, is not constituted out of other experiences. Becoming intuitively aware of circularity itself, however, is constituted out of other experiences, such as the experience of imagining concrete illustrations. Now consider the form-i.e. the form that some experiences must exhibit in order to constitute an intuition that makes its subject aware of some mathematical object. We can take bicycles as a model. Their parts must exhibit a form that enables a certain physical activity, specifically locomotion on two wheels by pedaling. In the previous section we considered the connection between awareness of something and the enabling of a certain mental activity, specifically entertaining demonstrative thoughts about that thing. So a natural idea is this: in order for some experiences to constitute an intuition that makes its subject aware of some mathematical object those experiences must exhibit a form that enables their subject to entertain demonstrative thoughts about that mathematical object. Consider, then, the following possible form and matter explanation for the existence of a mathematical intuition:
(4) This mathematical intuition-e.g. that circles are symmetrical about their diameters-exists because these experiences-e.g. imagining folding circles over their diameters-are so arranged to enable demonstrative thoughts about circularity.
Suppose claim (4) is true of some particular intuition. In this case the intuition non--casually depends on some experiences enabling demonstrative thoughts about circularity. But experiences cannot enable demonstrative thoughts about circularity if circularity does not exist (for recall: we are considering real demonstrative thought, not just seeming demonstrative thought). So the intuition non--causally depends on circularity. And that is the result we were looking for. This is just a sketch of a proposal. One might wonder: What does "arranged" mean in (4) mean? Can we say more about what some experiences must be like in order to enable demonstrative thoughts about an abstract object? Why believe that we ever really entertain demonstrative thoughts about abstract object, instead of just seeming to do so? These are good questions. A fuller account should address
